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Abstract 
 
Employment tenure, job turnover and returns to general and specific skills are examined for male 
workers  in Germany and the United States using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  Employment in Germany is characterized by longer 
duration and less frequent turnover than in the United States.  Returns to experience and tenure 
are lower in Germany than in the U.S.; however, peak earnings occur later.  This delayed peak in 
the employment-earnings profile provides an incentive for German workers to remain longer with 
their employers and change jobs less frequently. 
 
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
eterminants of workers’ wages are fundamental to understanding labor market activity. An extensive theoreti-
cal literature provides competing explanations for observed patterns in wage rates, and an active empirical li-
terature has confronted those theories with evidence.  The vast majority of this research has focused on indi-
vidual labor markets, and in particular, on the United States.  While much has been learned, a fairly open question is 
how well standard theories explain differences in wage setting processes across countries.  The research contained in 
this paper explores that topic by providing an initial examination of the determinants of pay in Germany relative to 
the United States.
1
 
 
 A common empirical pattern reported from the earliest research is an upward sloping tenure-earnings pro-
file along with an inverse relationship between turnover and tenure (Mincer 1962).  Three major theories provide ex-
planations for these basic empirical observations; human capital, job-matching, and efficiency wage.   
 
 According to human capital theory, workers are paid according to the value marginal product of general and 
specific labor market skills (Becker 1962 and Mincer 1962).  General skills are transportable to other employers and 
specific skills are not.  Since general skills are portable, firms should not pay for their financing.  Jobs providing 
general skills should have lower starting wages and a positively sloped experience-earnings profile.  Specific skills 
are not transportable and might be financed by the firm or the individual.  If financed by the firm, one would expect 
the employer to pay enough to the employee to discourage movement to their next best job opportunity so that the 
investment can be recouped.  If financed by the employee, a job would be characterized by lower starting pay and a 
relatively more steeply sloped wage-earnings profile than in the case of firm financing or absence of training.  Inter-
mediate cases of shared investment are also possible (Hashimoto 1981; Hashimoto 2001; and Leuven and Ooster-
beek 2001).  Regardless of the source of financing, the rising earnings profile induces a negative correlation between 
tenure and either quit rates or turnover (Parsons 1972).  
 
 In matching models, individuals receive job offers during their lifetimes, successively accepting offers 
which provide a better fit between them and attributes of the firm (Burdett 1978; Jovanovic 1979; and Flinn 1986).  
Thus, these models generate positively sloped tenure-earnings profiles which are independent of worker skill.  Turn-
over is negatively related to tenure due to match quality.  
 
____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the author via email. 
D 
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 In efficiency wage models, worker productivity is influenced by pay (Lazear 1981).  Young workers are 
paid less and older workers are paid more than their value marginal product.  This scheme induces young workers to 
put forth effort in order to stay with a firm until they can be overpaid as an older worker.  For older workers, the in-
centive is to work hard in order to continue being paid more than their value.  In the model, wages grow with tenure 
even in the absence of firm training.  The incentive pay scheme also induces a negative correlation between tenure 
and turnover. 
 
 A substantial empirical literature has sought to distinguish which factors from among these theories best ex-
plain patterns observed in returns to years of employment.  Human capital theory indicates that training on the job, 
whether worker or firm financed, and whether general or specific, should result in upward sloping wage profiles.  To 
estimate the relative contributions of general and specific skills in the theory, empirical researchers have typically fo-
cused on years of total work experience as a proxy for time spent gaining general labor market skills.  Similarly, the 
duration of employment with a single employer, tenure, is used as a proxy for time potentially spent acquiring specif-
ic labor market skills.  From the earliest work (Mincer 1962), the basic empirical pattern of positively sloped expe-
rience and tenure profiles has been universally reported. 
 
 The empirical observation that years of experience and tenure are each positively related to earnings is con-
sistent with human capital theory but does not rule out other explanations.  Job-matching theories also predict up-
ward sloping tenure-wage profiles, and a body of empirical work has examined the extent to which matching is re-
sponsible for this observation.   
 
 Some of that research takes an econometric approach to isolating the effect of job matching relative to te-
nure (Flinn 1986; Altonji and Shakotko 1987; and Topel 1991).  Based on those articles, one would reasonably con-
clude that job matching plays some role in generating observed returns to tenure although estimates of the exact con-
tribution vary.   
 
 In order to move away from econometric restrictions in attempts to identify the effect of matching on re-
turns to tenure, a more recent literature has exploited longitudinal data from job displacements (Kletzer 1989; Ruhm 
1991; and Neal 1995).  The argument behind these papers is that permanent job loss is an exogenous event uncon-
trolled by individual workers.  Comparing earnings before and after the event of an exogenously imposed job loss 
should reveal the extent to which returns to tenure are associated with factors related to that specific job match as 
opposed to skills which have become imbedded in the productive capital of the individual worker and are now trans-
portable across employers. 
 
 In each of these papers (Kletzer 1989; Ruhm 1991; and Neal 1995), years of job tenure prior to displace-
ment are found to be positively related to post-displacement earnings.  Kletzer (p. 539) reports that the returns to pre-
displacement tenure in post-displacement employment vary across blue and white collar workers.  She concludes that 
job match quality plays a larger role for returns to tenure for blue than white collar workers.  Similarly, Neal shows 
that those re-employed in the same industry following displacement are rewarded for tenure at virtually the same rate 
as before it occurred.  Those who change industries lose most of the returns to prior seniority.  Thus, the match be-
tween the worker and employer is important.  An additional observation is that the ability of workers to preserve re-
turns to tenure following job switches within an industry suggests that workers in the U.S. finance much of their own 
skill acquisition. 
 
 Efficiency wage theories also generate upwardly sloping tenure-earnings profiles.  One testable implication 
of the theory is that tenure-earnings profiles should be more flatly sloped in segments of the labor market where 
agency problems are not as large (Lazear and Moore 1986).  Also, since earnings will increase with tenure in the ab-
sence of productivity gains, returns to tenure will occur in firms with no training.  Levine (1993) finds that firms that 
provided more training did not exhibit larger returns to tenure.  Other researchers have investigated whether pay is 
linked with firm measures of worker productivity such as job evaluations and have found that the link is weak (Me-
doff and Abraham 1980 and 1981).  Thus, there is also empirical support for the view that firms use considerations 
beyond productivity in their wage setting process. 
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 In summary, these theoretical and empirical literatures have advanced together in attempting to explain 
which factors in the labor market lead to positively sloped tenure-earnings profiles and the corresponding negative 
correlation with job turnover.  All of the theories are attempting to explain this overarching empirical pattern.  At this 
point, most would agree that the market rewards general and specific skills and that returns to tenure additionally re-
flect both the quality of the job match as well as attempts of firms to raise productivity through the structure of com-
pensation. 
 
 While our understanding of factors which contribute to observed wage profiles and the inverse relationship 
between employment tenure and turnover has progressed, little attention has been paid to whether our basic under-
standing of how rewards in the labor market are related to tenure and turnover holds across societies.  The only com-
parative investigations of this type were made for Japan relative to the United States (Hashimoto and Raisian 1985 
and Levine 1993). 
 
 The work of Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) was motivated by the superior economic performance of Japan 
relative to the United States in the 1970s and 1980s and the observation that the Japanese labor market appeared to 
be characterized by longer attachments between firms and employees.  Using nationally representative data, they 
found that returns to additional years of employment are higher and peak later in Japan than in the U.S.  From this, 
they concluded that Japanese workers had a stronger incentive to remain with one employer, and this was reflected in 
lower rates of turnover and higher years of tenure in the Japanese labor market. 
 
 Levine (1993) used samples of matched firms and workers in Japan and the United States to critically ex-
amine whether human capital theory was consistent with the positively sloped employment-earnings profiles in the 
two countries.  Focusing primarily on whether firms that provide more training have steeper tenure-wage profiles and 
whether firms with higher returns to tenure have lower turnover, Levine presented evidence against both of these hy-
potheses.  He concludes that human capital theory is not consistent with the evidence presented and suggests that ef-
ficiency wage theory provides a better explanation of wage setting in the two countries.   
 
 While the existing literature has largely focused on individual countries in isolation, the research strategy 
chosen here is to make a comparison of two countries.  The aim of the research is to provide an examination of 
whether returns to skills are broadly predictive of differential patterns of employment tenure and labor turnover in 
Germany and the United States.  To begin, basic information regarding the duration of tenure and job turnover is 
provided for each country.  
 
2.0  Employment Tenure and Job Turnover in the U.S. and Germany 
 
 Incentives for workers to stay with an employer are reflected in years of continuous employment.  Table 1 
contains information regarding years of employment tenure for various age groupings in Germany and the United 
States.  The figures reported in the table are calculated using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
for the United States and from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for Germany for the years from 1984 
through 1992.  The figures in this table and all others in the paper are weighted to account for the longitudinal nature 
of the data.  Male workers ages 18 to 60 are included in the sample.  Additional selection criteria are that the worker 
must be employed 1000 hours in the year and must report annual earnings of 1000 Deutsche Marks or the U.S. 
equivalent.  Self-employed and government workers are excluded.  This sample is used in all of the analyses pre-
sented in the paper.  There are 10,440 observations from the PSID and 9,450 from the GSOEP. 
 
Among male workers ages 18 to 60, median employment tenure in Germany is seven years versus four for 
the United States.  Tenure is low in both countries in the early stages of labor market activity as would be expected.  
By mid-life, German workers remain longer with their employers.  Among male workers ages 35-44, median tenure 
in Germany is ten years as opposed to seven in the U.S.  In later years of working activity in the United States, me-
dian tenure declines.  As a result, in the oldest age range examined, median tenure is 16 years in Germany versus 8 in 
the U.S.  The attachment of workers to employers is more durable in Germany than in the United States, particularly 
as workers become older. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Male Population by Age and Tenure 1984-1992 
 
 United States Germany 
Age Median 
Tenure 
Less Than 
10 Years 
More Than 
15 Years 
Median 
Tenure 
Less Than 
10 Years 
More Than 
15 Years 
18-19 1.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
20-24 2.0 100.0 0.0 1.0 100.0 0.0 
25-34 3.0 86.0 3.0 4.0 83.0 3.0 
35-44 7.0 59.0 25.0 10.0 48.0 29.0 
45-49 11.0 48.0 41.0 14.0 33.0 49.0 
50-60 8.0 53.0 39.0 16.0 35.0 53.0 
All Ages 4.0 70.0 19.0 7.0 58.0 27.0 
Source:  The numbers reported in the table were calculated by the author using data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics for the United States and the German Socio-Economic Panel for Germa-
ny.  Data from both surveys were drawn from the panel years from 1984 through 1992 and are 
weighted to account for their longitudinal nature.  Other than the median tenure figures reported, the 
other table entries are percentages. 
 
 
 A brief examination of the tails of the distribution of years of tenure supports this conclusion.  Among all 
male workers in the United States, 70 percent have less than 10 years of tenure and 19 percent have more than 15 
years.  In Germany, 58 percent have less than 10 years of tenure while 27 percent have more than 15 years.  In Ger-
many relative to the United States, fewer workers have short durations with their employer and more have longer du-
rations.  This pattern is driven by older workers in Germany being characterized by having longer durations of em-
ployment than are observed in the United States. 
 
 The conclusion that the labor market in the United States is characterized by a shorter duration of tenure is 
important in what follows.  It would be helpful to know if the numbers calculated here agree with other sources of in-
formation.  While a comparative source of data is not available for Germany, the numbers shown in table 1 for the 
United States accord well with official statistics.  For example, the Statistical Abstract of the United States reports 
that in 1998, median years of tenure for workers ages 16 and over is 3.7 years and is 4.0 years for workers ages 20 
and over.  Here, it is calculated that years of tenure for a sample ages 18 to 60 is 4.0 years.  Perhaps of greater con-
cern for the United States data is the rising pattern for years of tenure that declines at later ages.  In the Statistical 
Abstract, the same pattern is observed. Although the numbers calculated here are from panel data and the official sta-
tistics are based on cross-sectional data with a larger sample, the figures are nonetheless close in their levels and ex-
hibit similar patterns in the movement of years of tenure with age.
2
 
 
 All of the major theories which generate positively sloped tenure-earnings profiles predict not only increas-
ing tenure with age but also decreasing turnover.  Table 2 contains turnover information for the United States and 
Germany calculated as the average number of new job starts for the same age groups considered in table 1.  In both 
countries, turnover declines rapidly as workers enter their twenties.  In Germany, turnover rates remain low thereaf-
ter for the remainder of the age ranges considered in the table.  In the U.S., turnover rates decline but then rise again.  
This overall pattern is similar to the one seen in tenure.  Years of tenure expanded monotonically conditional on age 
for Germany while turnover declines.  In the U.S., years of tenure initially increased but declined for older workers -- 
turnover declines before expanding. 
 
Comparing the two countries, in every age interval after age 20, German workers start fewer new jobs than 
American workers.  From the mid-30s onward, American workers appear to have at least double the chance of a typ-
ical German of beginning new employment.  For example, American workers in the age bracket from 35-44 have a 
33 percent chance of starting new employment versus a 13 percent chance in Germany.  From ages 50-60, the chance 
of a German worker beginning new employment is 22 percent versus 42 percent in the U.S.  Thus, the patterns in 
turnover for Germany and the United States are similar to those seen for years of tenure.  German workers, particu-
larly in later years of their working lives, experience less turnover and thus accumulate more employment tenure than 
American workers. 
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Table 2: Number of Different Jobs Per Male Worker: 
Germany and the United States 1984-1992 
 
  New Jobs Started Per Year 
  Per Person Over the Age Interval 
  Germany U.S. Germany U.S. 
Age 18-19 .29 .28 .88 .84 
 20-24 .10 .12 .50 .61 
 25-34 .02 .04 .24 .42 
 35-44 .01 .03 .13 .33 
 45-49 .02 .06 .13 .31 
 50-60 .02 .04 .22 .42 
Source:  These figures are based on calculations from the PSID and GSOEP of new job 
starts over the relevant age intervals.  In both countries, new starts are counted as jobs with 
less than one year of tenure.  Data are used from the panel years from 1984 through 1992 in 
both countries.  For more information on the sample, see the description in the text. 
 
 
3.0  Returns to Experience and Tenure in Germany and the United States 
 
 The rate of increase in wages directly influences observed years of tenure and rates of employment turno-
ver.  To calculate returns to employment for Germany and the United States, panel regressions of log wages on stan-
dard explanatory variables are estimated using the samples of male workers from the PSID and GSOEP which have 
been previously described. 
 
 For the variables used to decompose the employment experience of a typical worker into proxies for their 
general and specific skills, conventions in the literature regarding their measurement are followed.  In both data sets, 
retrospective information on years of full-time employment experience is used to calculate years of total labor market 
experience.  This variable is considered a proxy for general labor market skills.  Also, information regarding years of 
employment with a specific employer is used to calculate years of tenure for the workers in each country.  This vari-
able is considered a proxy for specific skills.  Other regressors included in the analysis are marital status and years of 
schooling.  The dependent variable is the natural log of average hourly wages calculated as annual labor earnings di-
vided by annual work hours.  The wages are measured as real 1984 figures.  Means and standard deviations of the 
pooled sample of observations from each country are reported in table 3. 
 
Table 3: Regressions of Male Wages for Germany and the United States:  1984-1992 
 
 Means and Standard Deviations Regressions 
 United States Germany United States Germany 
Regressors:     
Experience 11.44 (8.10) 19.21 (11.42) .069 (.005) .029 (.002) 
Experience2 1.96 (2.59) 4.99 (4.67) -.601 (.057) -.205 (.022) 
Experience3 4.26 (7.86) 14.73 (17.88) .220 (.026) .059 (.008) 
Experience4 10.57 (24.11) 46.74 (68.53) -.028 (.004) -.006 (.001) 
Tenure 8.59 (8.12) 11.04 (8.73) .038 (.004) .013 (.002) 
Tenure2 1.40 (2.44) 1.98 (2.66) -.216 (.044) -.105 (.023) 
Tenure3 3.08 (7.68) 4.38 (8.39) .058 (.018) .039 (.010) 
Tenure4 7.93 (25.72) 11.02 (27.9) -.006 (.003) -.005 (.001) 
Years of School 12.76 (2.44) 11.46 (2.52) .048 (.001) .018 (.001) 
Marital Status .71 (.45) .75 (.43) .046 (.006) .030 (.004) 
Log Wages .87 (.31)  --------------- --------------- 
R-Squared --------------- --------------- .34 .26 
N 10,110 8,281 10,110 8,281 
Source: The estimates presented in the table are based on calculations by the author using data drawn from the 1984 through 1992 years 
of the PSID and GSOEP.  A full description of the sample is contained in the text.  The estimates are weighted to reflect the longitudinal 
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nature of the data.  Entries in the columns for mean and standard deviation take the form: mean(standard deviation).  Entries in the col-
umns for the regressions take the form: parameter(standard error). 
 
 
The equation estimated can be written as: 
 
ititnitnitjitjitY  
2
43
2
21 . 
 
Y refers to the log of average hourly wages.  The subscript i refers to individuals, and t refers to the time period.  J 
represents years of full-time job experience for worker i at time t.  N represents years of tenure with an employer for 
worker i at time t.  ε is measurement error. 
 
 In addition to the means and standard deviations of the variables, table 3 contains parameter estimates from 
the regressions for Germany and the United States.  Based on those estimates, in the U.S., the estimated return to a 
year of experience is 4.8 percent and for an additional year of employment tenure is 5.2 percent.   For Germany, the 
returns to both experience and tenure are much lower than in the United States.  Returns to years of experience are 
1.9 percent and 1.5 percent for a year of tenure.  The returns to both experience and tenure in Germany and the Unit-
ed States have the expected shape in that they increase at a decreasing rate.  This can be seen by the negative signs of 
the parameter estimates associated with squared terms for tenure and experience in each country.  All of the relevant 
parameter estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels. 
 
 The result that returns to experience and tenure in Germany are low relative to the United States is striking.  
Whether these returns are consistent with patterns of the duration of tenure and labor turnover, however, depends on 
how many years of employment pass before the returns peak as opposed to the rate of increase in an individual year.  
Table 4 contains calculations in each country of the total returns to additional years of work for someone who is con-
tinuously employed along with the peak years of the wage profiles.  The total returns are decomposed for the two 
countries into the contributions from experience and tenure.
3
  For each of the measures considered, returns to expe-
rience, returns to tenure, and the total, the wage profile peaks much later in Germany than in the United States.  For 
example, returns to tenure in Germany peak after 37 years of employment versus 24 in the U.S.  Returns to years of 
employment peak after 20 years in the U.S.  and after 28 in Germany.  These comparatively later peaks in employ-
ment-earnings profiles provide an incentive for German workers to remain with their employers relatively longer 
than would be expected in the U.S. 
 
 
Table 4: Percent Growth in Earnings Due to Experience and Tenure for  
Continuous  Employment in Germany and the United States 
  United States Germany 
  Experience Tenure Total Experience Tenure Total 
Tenure         
5 years  14 21.5 35.5 8.3 6.9 15.2 
10 years  23 38 61 14.6 12.8 27.4 
15 years  27 49.5 76.5 18.9 17.7 36.6 
20 years  26 56 82 21.2 21.6 42.8 
25 years  20 57.5 77.5 21.5 24.5 46 
30 years  9 54 63 19.8 26.4 46.2 
        
Peak  17 24 20 23 37 28 
Source: These figures are calculated using the regression parameters presented in table 3.  Returns to experience and tenure are 
calculated respectively as jy  and ny  .  The total return is calculated as the sum of these two parts. 
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4.0  Conclusion 
 
 The patterns of returns to experience and tenure observed in Germany and the United States are broadly 
consistent with each of the major theories developed to explain the relationship of returns to tenure and turnover.  In 
both countries, returns to experience and tenure are positive and increase at a decreasing rate.  In terms of both expe-
rience and tenure, wage profiles in Germany peak later than in the U.S.  As a result, the employment-wage profile al-
so peaks later in Germany.  
 
 Comparatively, one would expect that a country with a later peak in the employment-wage profile would al-
so have longer employment durations and lower rates of labor turnover, particularly as workers move beyond their 
early years of job searching.  Those patterns are observed here with respect to Germany and the United States.  Ger-
many has longer median employment tenure and lower labor turnover than in the United States. 
 
 While these broad patterns are consistent with any of the major theories used to explain the relationship be-
tween returns to skill and employment tenure, an interesting and unexplained result is the relatively lower returns to 
both experience and tenure in the German economy.  Institutionally, Germany operates in a more collective manner 
at the industry level to provide training to workers.  This is seen in their dual system of education where high school 
students simultaneously undertake trade apprenticeships and supportive industry specific courses.  The training of 
these workers is financed in part by the relevant industry group.  The lower returns to experience, tenure, and educa-
tion in Germany are consistent with industry financing of a large component of the training.  Wages would be pre-
dicted to increase more slowly because the firms in the industry are attempting to recoup their investment in the 
worker.  While this is conjecture, it nonetheless casts an interesting perspective on the belief that wage dispersion is 
lower in Germany due to social norms.  In part, the relatively small dispersion of wages (and earnings) in Germany 
may be due to the nature of shared investments in worker skills.  Investigating this conjecture remains for future re-
search.   
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Endnotes 
 
1. The paper considers only workers from the former West Germany in order to avoid issues associated with 
German reunification.  Samples used in the paper cover the period from 1984-1992.  Reunification occurred 
in 1989. 
2. A more detailed examination may be made by reference to the Statistical Abstract of the United States: 
1999 (table 670). 
3. The returns to experience and tenure are calculated respectively as jy  and ny  .  The total is calcu-
lated as the sum of the individual parts. 
